The Munich Agreement Said

The slogan “Above us, without us!” (Czech: O n`s bez n`s!) sums up the feelings of the Czechoslovakian population (Slovakia and the Czech Republic) towards the agreement. [Citation required] On its way to Germany, Czechoslovakia (as the state was renamed) lost its reasonable border with Germany and its fortifications. Without it, its independence became more nominal than more real. The agreement also caused Czechoslovakia to lose 70% of its steel industry, 70% of its electricity and 3.5 million citizens to Germany. [61] The Sudeten Germans celebrated what they saw as their liberation. The impending war, it seemed, had been averted. The firm met in the evening. The Prime Minister was no worse for his experience. He spoke for more than an hour. He told us that, from the beginning, Hitler had taken a certain position and refused to deviate a centimeter from it. Many of the most important points did not seem to have appeared in their discussion, particularly the international guarantee. After saying that he had informed Hitler that he was creating an impossible situation, after admitting that he had “snorted” with indignation by reading it the German terms, the Prime Minister concluded to my astonishment that he thought that we should accept these conditions and that we should advise the Czechs to do so. It was then proposed that the cabinet be adjourned to give members time to read the conditions and sleep on them, and that we meet again the next morning.

I protested. I said that, from what the Prime Minister had told us, it seemed to me that the Germans were still convinced that we would not fight under any circumstances, that there was still a method and one method to bring it to the contrary, by immediately declaring full mobilization. I said that I am sure that public opinion would eventually force us to help us help the Czechs; So far we have been confronted with the unpleasant alternatives of peace with ignorance or war. I now saw a third possibility, that of shameful war, with which I thought I was thrown into war by the boot of public opinion, when those for whom we are fighting were already defeated. I pointed out that the day before, the Chiefs of Staff had indicated that immediate mobilization was of paramount and urgent importance, and I suggested that one day we should explain why we did not follow their advice. That the Prime Minister. He said that I had failed to say that this Council had only been given on the assumption that there would be a risk of war with Germany in the coming days. I said I thought it would be hard to deny that there was such a danger. The New York Times made the front page of the Munich agreement: “Hitler receives less than his claims from the Sudetenland,” and reports that a “joyful crowd” had applauded Daladier on his return to France and that Chamberlain had been “wildly applauded” upon his return to the UK. [54] We know that the German General Staff is well informed on these issues, but the House of Commons has not yet taken seriously its obligation to insure on these issues. The interior minister said he wanted an investigation. Many things have been done that reflect the greater recognition of the administration.

But the crucial things are what we want to know. During these three years, I have always asked for a secret meeting at which these issues could be cancelled, or an investigation by a special committee of Parliament or some other method.